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IS THE SUPREME COURT CONCERNED WITH PATENT LAW, THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, OR BOTH: A RESPONSE TO JUDGE TIMOTHY 
B. DYK 
 
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK* 
 
In his article, Judge Timothy B. Dyk offers very important insights to 
the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.1 He has also provided, from his unique 
perspective on the Federal Circuit bench, a helpful overview of how the 
Supreme Court cases have impacted the Federal Circuit’s docket and case 
law.2 His discussion of how the Supreme Court interventions create 
collateral effects, such as triggering litigants to raise subject matter eligibility 
challenges, are particularly interesting.3 
Most illuminating is Judge Dyk’s statistical comparisons of the regional 
circuits versus the Federal Circuit in terms of the frequency that the Supreme 
Court takes cases. Indeed, he helpfully accounts for the size of each court’s 
caseload, uncovering that the Supreme Court takes “comparatively more of 
[the Federal Circuit’s] cases . . . with the D.C. Circuit a close second.”4 
While the reversal rate for the Federal Circuit is comparable to that of other 
circuits,5 there nevertheless is something at work within the Supreme Court 
vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit. Admittedly some of the grants of certiorari to 
the Federal Circuit involve non-patent cases.6 But the cases that dominate 
the Supreme Court’s review of the Federal Circuit are the patent ones. In 
 
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. My thanks to the Chicago-Kent Journal of 
Intellectual Property for affording me this opportunity to comment on Judge Dyk’s insightful and 
informative piece. 
 1. Hon. Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 67 (2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 74-75. 
 4. Id. at 68. 
 5. See id. at 72. The reversal rates for all circuits, except for the First Circuit, are all above 50%, 
which isn’t surprising. General convention is that the Supreme Court usually does not grant certiorari 
simply to affirm. 
 6. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 85 
U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1293); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. U.S., 563 U.S. 478 (2011). 
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fact, since Judge Dyk’s article was published, the Supreme Court granted 
review in two more cases.7 
So what is going on here? Judge Dyk’s statistics give a mixed view of 
the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. In some 
regards, the Court is treating the Federal Circuit like any other Circuit. But 
in other ways, the Court is treating the Federal Circuit exceptionally, 
reviewing more per capita of the court’s cases. There are other indicia that 
what is driving the Supreme Court’s review of the Federal Circuit is a 
particular interest in patent law and not a broader interest in intellectual 
property generally, as some of posited. A review of the Supreme Court’s 
intellectual property cases does not support that hypothesis. Of course, there 
are always questions about how one categorizes whether something is a 
patent, trademark,8 or copyright case. Since 2000, patent cases have 
dominated the Supreme Court’s docket compared to other intellectual 
property cases. The Court has taken at least one patent case each year since 
its October 2004 term and multiple cases in every term since the October 
2010 term. 
The below table9 shows, for each Supreme Court term, the number of 
cases for each term in each one of the three disciplines. Some believe that 
the Supreme Court is interested not just in patent law, but also in copyright 
and trademark. In other words, the Supreme Court is simply interested in 
intellectual property. The table belies that belief. The Supreme Court is 
 
 7. Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3529 
(U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 15-1195); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 614 (mem.) (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341).  
 8. The table at the end of the paper lists the cases that were included. See table infra Appendix. 
One may disagree as to whether a particular case should be included. For example, some legitimately 
would not include Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products, 559 U.S. 175 (2009), in the list of 
trademark/unfair competition cases. Mac’s Shell dealt with the ability of franchisors to cancel franchise 
agreements under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801. It impacts some franchise 
relationships, so it seemed germane to trademark law and unfair competition. Similarly, one could argue 
that Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Echrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2005), should not be deemed a patent 
case as the issue had to do with appellate jurisdiction over jury trials (in this case, it was a patent case) 
and not a substantive patent law issue. In my choice of cases, I generally was overly inclusive. Regardless 
of the marginal cases, patent cases numerically dominate the docket of the Supreme Court compared to 
other intellectual property cases. One could argue that the decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse 
Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016), should only count as one, even though it was consolidated with 
the Stryker v. Zimmer case. Technically, Stryker was a grant on the merits, not a GVR, and it was decided 
along with Halo. Moreover, the outcome could have been like the Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1744 (2014), scenario, where the Court addressed the legal standard in the former and the standard 
of review in the latter. Regardless, the patent cases vastly outnumber the trademark and copyright cases 
at the Supreme Court. 
 9. This table is an updated version of one I previous published. See Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 64 (2013).  
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interested in patent law far more than the other areas. And that is somewhat 
surprising: because appeals in copyright and trademark cases go to the 
regional circuits, splits in authority develop that the Supreme Court could 
resolve. No such splits exist in patent law given the Federal Circuit’s national 
jurisdiction. Yet the Court has taken drastically more patent cases than 
copyright and trademark cases combined. Thus, something else is at work 




So what else is going on? Likely it is a confluence of factors,11 but one 
reason for the Court’s interest is clearly some suspicion about the Federal 
Circuit as an institution. It seems as if the Supreme Court permitted the 
Federal Circuit to “grow up” in a sense during the first 20 or so years of the 
Federal Circuit’s existence. Such maturation was likely important to the 
legitimacy of the Federal Circuit. As an experiment in specialization, the 
Federal Circuit served a unique role in the federal court system. Given 
suspicions surrounding specialized courts, the Federal Circuit needed to 
develop credibility in order to achieve its legislative mission of bringing 
uniformity to U.S. patent law. 
Judge Dyk does recognize one important contribution that the Supreme 
Court has made to patent jurisprudence: reconciling the Federal Circuit’s 
 
 10. The October 2016 term may provide a unique scenario. With the death of Justice Scalia, the 
Court may be more reticent to take hot-button issues on which the Court may split 4-4. Consequently, 
there may be more IP cases in this term in an effort to fill the Court’s docket with less controversial cases.  
 11. See generally Holbrook, supra note 9 (discussing a variety of factors that explain the Supreme 
Court’s recent resurgent engagement with patent law).  
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jurisprudence with that of other areas.12 Elsewhere I have dubbed this “patent 
exceptionalism”: the tendency for the Federal Circuit to treat patent law as if 
it is in its own silo and to not consider how it engages with other areas of 
law.13 Indeed, such judicial myopia was one of the concerns with the creation 
of an expert court, and the Supreme Court appears to be acting as an antidote 
to some of those concerns.14 Judge Dyk is absolutely correct that, for 
example, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.15 and MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc.,16 the Court brought patent law back into the fold of the 
broader legal landscape. 17 
Relatedly, at times, the Supreme Court’s intervention into patent law is 
part of a broader agenda at the Court. For example, the Court has taken two 
cases18 dealing with 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), an infringement provision that 
explicitly provides U.S. patent owners with some extraterritorial protection 
when parts of the patented invention are exported.19 The Court’s interest here 
is not simply patent law: it is a broader interest in reformulating and 
bolstering the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law.20 These cases, therefore, are part of the Court’s larger project of 
reshaping the law of extraterritoriality. In both of these aspects, it is clear 
that the Supreme Court does not view patent law as distinct from other areas 
of the law. 
Judge Dyk also identifies an area with which the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court appear to disagree: the appropriate use of brighter line rules 
 
 12. Dyk, supra note 1, at 76. 
 13. Holbrook, supra note 9, at 71 (“The Supreme Court appears to be aware of this risk and is acting 
to bring patent law back into the legal tapestry, rejecting any form of patent exceptionalism.”). 
 14. Id.; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 769, 772 (2004) (discussing ways the court has failed 
to consider broader considerations and has “veered in other ways from standard judicial practice”); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 NYU L. REV. 1, 
3 (1989) (noting concerns of “doctrinal isolation” that “may lead to a body of law out of tune with legal 
developments elsewhere”). 
 15. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 16. 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 17. Dyk, supra note 1, at 76. 
 18. Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted 136 S. Ct. 
2505 (2016); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). The Court had also asked for the 
views of the Solicitor General regarding the extraterritorial reach of § 271(a)’s offer to sell and sale 
provisions, Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 381 
(2013); though the case settled before the Solicitor General filed the brief. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014). 
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2013). 
 20. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement 
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to provide some level of guidance.21 Commentators have long noted the 
Federal Circuit’s penchant for fairly bright-line, formalistic rules over more 
nuanced, context-specific standards.22 The court seems to prefer such rules 
in order to provide notice and certainty to various actors in the patent 
system.23 The Supreme Court for the most part has rejected efforts by the 
Federal Circuit to craft such rules, replacing them with more contextual 
analyses.24 The Court’s chaffing at the Federal Circuit’s adoption of such 
rules likely is not tied merely to its concerns for the lack of nuance. Likely 
the Court fears that such rules represent a pro-patent bias.25 Of course, not 
all of these formalistic rules have been pro-patent, such as the absolute bar 
rule for prosecution history estoppel in Festo. Nevertheless, both a former26 
and current justice27 have both spoken to concerns about the expert court, 
and likely this concern feeds into the Court’s rejection of the Federal 
Circuit’s rules. 
Judge Dyk does decry one aspect of the Court’s recent engagement, 
noting that “while the Supreme Court does take many of our cases, it does 
not take that many, limiting the opportunities for the Supreme Court to 
communicate its views . . .”28 Judge Dyk in the main is correct. There are 
occasions, however, when the Supreme Court does seem to attempt to clarify 
an earlier decision, perhaps if it views lower courts as not implementing its 
earlier decision in an appropriate fashion. In what I have dubbed a “bookend” 
approach,29 the Supreme Court at times takes cases that seem paired with 
 
 21. Dyk, supra note 1, at 80 (“Our court, in keeping with the legislative history of our statute, views 
our task as in part articulating clear rules; the Supreme Court on the other hand views clear rules as often 
suspect.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 127 (2005); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal 
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (2003). 
 23. See, e.g., Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“Applying established concepts of contract law, rather than some more amorphous test, implements the 
broad goal of Pfaff, which, in replacing this court’s ‘totality of the circumstances’ test with more precise 
requirements, was to bring greater certainty to the analysis of the on-sale bar.”). 
 24. Dyk, supra note 1, at 80-81 (discussing examples); Holbrook, supra note 9, at 76-77. 
 25. Holbrook, supra note 9, at 72. 
 26. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote 
to the risk that the specialized court may develop an institutional bias.”). 
 27. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“In either event, a decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important 
ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently 
administered and enforced, adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent 
laws . . . embod[y].” (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989))). 
 28. Dyk, supra note 1, at 78. 
 29. Holbrook, supra note 9, at 72. 
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each other in order to illuminate or counter one of its earlier decisions. The 
classic example of this dynamic is that of Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co.30 and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co.31 Applying Warner-Jenkinson, the Federal Circuit adopted an absolute 
bar rule for prosecution history estoppel: whenever an applicant made a 
narrowing amendment for reasons related to patentability, access to the 
doctrine of equivalents was completely precluded.32 The Supreme Court, in 
rejecting the absolute bar, felt that the Federal Circuit had “ignored the 
guidance of Warner–Jenkinson.”33 
Similar pairings of cases can be seen elsewhere. The tetralogy of subject 
matter eligibility cases likely was a response to the lower court’s inability to 
resolve the issue well.34 The Court’s rejection of bright-line rules in Halo and 
Octane Fitness also fits this dynamic, as the rationale offered by the Federal 
Circuit below had tethered these provisions together. Seemingly the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s burden shifting for 
declaratory judgment actions in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family 
Ventures, LLC35 is a response to the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the 
earlier MedImmune decision.36 Indeed, at times the Court appears to be 
taking a bookend case, even if it ultimately does not provide the proper 
vehicle. For example, the Court’s decision in Bowman v. Monsanto Co.37 
may have been an effort by the Court to clarify patent exhaustion doctrine 
after its decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,38 though 
Bowman ultimately proved to be somewhat of a non-event. The Court’s 
 
 30. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 31. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 32. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (“when a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, no range of equivalents is 
available for the amended claim.”), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 33. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
 34. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 35. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014). 
 36. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). This dynamic may also 
transcend patent law, as the Court’s decision in the trademark case provides somewhat of an antidote to 
MedImmune by allowing a rights holder to a declaratory judgment by providing a covenant not to sue. 
See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 732-33 (2013). 
 37. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). For example, Justice Sotomayor asked in oral arguments in Bowman, 
“Both of you are suggesting . . . that we were explicit enough in Quanta and we don’t have to address 
whatever lingering confusion the Federal Circuit may have with respect to conditional sales at all in this 
case?” Boman v. Monsanto Co., No.11-796, oral argument transcript at 49, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2012/11-796-1j43.pdf.  
 38. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
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decision in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.39 also sheds light into 
its holding in Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.40The Court also will 
bookend patent and copyright cases that deal with a similar issue. For 
example, the Supreme Court has looked to induced infringement,41 laches,42 
and exhaustion43 in both patent and copyright law. In this fashion, it appears 
that the Supreme Court is attempting provide some level of clarity to the law 
while recognizing it is not a court of error correction; nor can it provide 
highly detailed elaborations of the legal rules it adopts. 
What is to be made of these various dynamics driving, at least in part, 
the Supreme Court’s recent activity? Judge Dyk notes “I continue to believe 
that Supreme Court review of our patent cases has been critical to the 
development of patent law and likewise beneficial to our court.”44 I am not 
quite as sanguine regarding the Court’s involvement. At best, it has been a 
mixed bag. Some of the Court’s interventions have appropriately 
recalibrated patent law, such as eBay’s rejection of a near-per se rule of 
granting permanent injunctions and KSR’s rejection of the overly formalistic 
application of the “teaching-suggestion-motivation to combine” test for 
obviousness. Others, however, have simply gone off the rails, particularly 
the Court’s foray into patentable subject matter.45 
What is clear, however, is that the Supreme Court is interested in both 
patent law and the Federal Circuit. The Court also does not intend to be a 
dilettante in patent law and will continue to engage with patent law. The days 
of the “invisible Supreme Court” are over.46 While the Supreme Court’s 
early abdication to the Federal Circuit may have been appropriate to allow 
 
 39. 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (2015). 
 40. 563 U.S. 754 (2011). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet 
Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1021-25 (2016) (discussing 
Commil and how it relates to Global-Tech).  
 41. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 763 (discussing Grokster copyright case); Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (importing induced infringement from patent law into 
copyright law).  
 42. SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC, No. 15-927, 2017 WL 
1050978 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2017); Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
 43. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 44. Dyk, supra note 1, at 78. 
 45. Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 973, 974 
(2015) (“The recent eligibility case law—a frenzied outpouring of opinions from many esteemed 
judges—has revealed little while mystifying much.”).  
 46. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 
387 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has rendered itself well-nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law. 
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that court to develop institutional legitimacy,47 the Supreme Court is now a 
key player in patent law. The Federal Circuit seems to be “getting the 
message” from the Supreme Court.48 But, with the advent of various 
administrative proceedings at the US Patent and Trademark Office and the 
new “first-inventor-to-file” regime, both the result of the America Invents 
Act, the Supreme Court seems poised to continue its engagement with 
striking the appropriate balance in patent law between patent holders and the 
public. Many may disagree with where the Court draws that line, but there 
is no doubt such line drawing will continue for the foreseeable future. It is 
refreshing to see that Judge Dyk views this role for the Supreme Court in a 
laudable light.49 
APPENDIX 
Patent SCT Cases Citation Term 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. 
794 F.3d 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 808 
(2017) 
2016 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands 
LLC 
821 F.3d 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 614 
2016 
Impression Products v. Lexmark Int’l 
816 F.3d 721 
(Fed. Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 




 47. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Federal Circuit Acquiescence(?), AM. U. L. REV. —- (forthcoming 
2017) (draft at 4-6), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931184 (arguing 
that Supreme Court’s lack of involvement in patent law for the first 18-20 years of the Federal Circuit 
likely allowed the court to legitimize itself vis-à-vis the district courts, whom had never been subject to 
review of this new court).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Of course, as Judge Dyk notes, if the Court remains involved in the patent law, it may be helpful 
for them to take a few Federal Circuit clerks as law clerks . . . perhaps one from Emory Law or Chicago-
Kent! 
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Feb. 22, 2017) 
2016 
SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First 




Mar. 21, 2017) 
2016 
Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple 
137 S. Ct. 429 
(2016) 
2016 
Cuozzo v. Lee 
136 S. Ct. 2131 
(2016) 
2015 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc. 
136 S. Ct. 1923 
(2016) 
2015 
Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc. 
136 S. Ct. 1923 
(2016) 
2015 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 
135 S. Ct. 1920 
(2015) 
2014 
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC 
135 S. Ct. 2401 
(2015) 
2014 
Teva Pharms. USA v. Sandoz 
135 S. Ct. 831 
(2015) 
2014 
Limelight Networks v. Akamai Techs. 
134 S. Ct. 2111 
(2014) 
2013 
Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments 
134 S. Ct. 2120 
(2014) 
2013 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014) 
2013 
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mngmnt Sys. 
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Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness 
134 S. Ct. 1749 
(2014) 
2013 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 
LLC 
134 S. Ct. 843 
(2014) 
2013 
F.T.C. v. Actavis 
133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013) 
2012 
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. 
133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) 
2012 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 
133 S. Ct. 1761 
(2013) 
2012 
Gunn v. Minton 
133 S. Ct. 1059 
(2013) 
2012 
Mayo v. Prometheus 
566 U.S. 66 
(2012) 
2011 
Kappos v. Hyatt 
566 U.S. 431 
(2012) 
2011 
Caraco Pharm. Labs, Lt. v. Novo Nordisk 
566 U.S. 399 
(2012) 
2011 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 
563 U.S. 754 
(2011) 
2010 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. 
563 U.S. 776 
(2011) 
2010 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership 
564 U.S. 91 
(2011) 
2010 
Bilski v. Kappos 
561 U.S. 593 
(2010) 
2009 
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. 
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Quanta v. LG Elecs. 
553 U.S. 617 
(2008) 
2007 
KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc. 
550 U.S. 398 
(2007) 
2006 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.  
550 U.S. 437 
(2007) 
2006 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 
549 U.S. 118 
(2007) 
2006 
Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite 
548 U.S. 124 
(2006) 
2005 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
547 U.S. 388 
(2006) 
2005 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc. 
547 U.S. 28 
(2006) 
2005 
Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. 
546 U.S. 394 
(2006) 
2005 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 
545 U.S. 193 
(2005) 
2004 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circ. Sys., 
Inc. 
535 U.S. 826 
(2002) 
2001 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co. 
535 U.S. 722 
(2002) 
2001 
J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc. 
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Copyright SCT Cases Citation Term 
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. 
Star Athletica, 
L.L.C. v. Varsity 
Brands, Inc., No. 
15-866, 2017 
WL 1066261 
(U.S. Mar. 22, 
2017) 
2016 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
136 S. Ct. 1979 
(2016) 
2015 
American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, 
Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 2498 
(2014) 
2013 
Petrella v. MGM, Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 1962 
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